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GAG ORDERS AND THE ULTIMATE SANCTION
I. INTRODUCTION
"Babykiller!" The media quickly and collectively branded a New
Jersey teenager a "babykiller" for the murder of her newborn son.' The
alleged acts of Amy Grossberg, a college freshman from a well-to-do family,
became the focal point of the most sensationalized and publicized criminal
case in Delaware history. Police reports state that Amy and her high school
sweetheart, Brian Peterson, checked into a Comfort Inn motel shortly after
midnight on November 12, 1996, where Amy gave birth to a healthy six-
pound, two-ounce boy. After the delivery, Brian put the baby in a plastic
bag and tossed him into the trash.' Later that night, Amy returned to her
dormitory room at the University of Delaware, and collapsed the next day
from complications arising out of the delivery.4 She was rushed to a
hospital where doctors discovered she had recently given birth.5 A search
for the baby ensued, and police discovered the newborn's body in a
dumpster behind the motel.6 State autopsy reports concluded that the baby
died of multiple skull fractures, sustained from blunt head trauma.7
The extensive media coverage of this first-degree murder case
prompted Delaware Superior Court Judge Henry duPont Ridgely to issue a
1. See Elizabeth Gleick, Three Kids, One Death; They Were Happy and Well-Off. Why Did
They Dump Their Baby Possibly After Crushing Its Skull?, TIME, Dec. 2, 1996, at 69; Don Feder,
Fetal Homicide Should Be a Crime, BOSTON HERALD, Jan. 3, 1997, (Editorial), at 29; Rudy
Larini, Accused Baby-Killer Pair Take a Step Toward Home, STAR-LEDGER (Newark, N.J.), Jan.
23, 1997, at 13; Steve Marshall, Teen Surrenders Amid Screams of 'Baby Killer!,' USA TODAY,
Nov. 22, 1996, at 3A.
2. Peter J. Sampson, Teens Lose Motion to Influence Jury; Indictment Seen Near in Baby's
Death, RECORD (Bergen County, N.J.), Dec. 7, 1996, at A3. The defense disputed the fact that the
baby was born healthy, contending that the baby was stillborn and had a severe brain defect.
Doug Most, Wyckoff Teens Prosecutor to Stay; No Violations Found in Judge's Gag Order,
RECORD (Bergen County, N.J.), Sept. 20, 1997, at A3.
3. Id.
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gag order on November 21, 1996.8 The gag order prohibited attorneys from
speaking with the media, including television, newspapers, and magazines;
however, the media was exempt from the gag order. Thus, the onslaught of
negative publicity portraying the young teenagers continued. 9
The nationally televised news show 20/20 presented a story from a
different perspective-one that highlighted Amy's caring and humane side.
On June 6, 1997, Barbara Walters interviewed Amy, her parents, and her
attorney, Robert Gottlieb.' ° At the beginning of the show's segment, Ms.
Walters acknowledged the gag order applied only to lawyers and
investigators, not to Amy or her parents. Accordingly, under Mr. Gottlieb's
direction, Amy and her parents talked about her background as a good
student and camp counselor, her close relationship with her parents, and the
productive use of her two-month experience in jail."1
During the interview, Mr. Gottlieb told Ms. Walters that "Amy should
not have been charged. Amy is not guilty. 1 2 He continued, "it's never too
late to do what is right based on the evidence. And it's only after time and
over time that you really find out what a case is about. It's our hope that
they'll take this opportunity and take a fresh look at the case." 3 In response
to these statements, Judge Ridgely dismissed Mr. Gottlieb from the case for
violating the gag order.1 4  Thus, Mr. Gottlieb, who had been admitted to
8. State v. Grossberg, No. 9611007818 (Del. Super. Ct. Nov. 21, 1996) (order limiting
pretrial publicity) (on file with the Loyola of Los Angeles Entertainment Law Journal) [hereinafter
Order].
9. See generally Diana Butler, The Trap of Moral Relativism: The Recent Indictments of
Two College Freshmen on Charges of Infanticide Bring Home the Great Need for a Unifying,
Noncontextual Ethic, L.A. DAILY NEWS, Dec. 15, 1996, (Viewpoint), at 1 (commenting on the
ethically wrong choice made by Grossberg and Peterson for allegedly killing their newborn, despite
their social advantages of being wealthy and educated); Leonard Pitts, Jr., The Upper Crust Has
its Own Barbarians, TAMPA TRIB., Dec. 1, 1996, (Commentary), at 2 (noting that Grossberg and
Peterson's race and financial status does not mean they automatically wear badges of morality);
20/20 (ABC television broadcast, June 6, 1997) (voicing concern of Mrs. Grossberg that Amy had
been falsely portrayed in the media as a spoiled, rich kid).
10. Mr. Gottlieb was admitted to practice in this action pro hac vice on May 12, 1997. See
State v. Grossberg, 705 A.2d 608, 611 (Del. 1997).
11. While incarcerated, Amy tutored prisonmates in their academic classes and "tried to be
[as] productive as [she] could there." 20/20: A Death in the Family (ABC television broadcast,
June 6, 1997). Both Amy and Brian were released on $300,000 bail and live at their respective
homes while awaiting trial. They wear electronic monitoring devices on their ankles. Doug Most,
Wyckoff Teens' Trial Put Off Experts: Delay Aids Defense, RECORD (Bergen County, N.J.), Sept.
4, 1997, at Li.
12. 20/20: A Death in the Fanily (ABC television broadcast, June 6, 1997).
13. Id.
14. See Grossberg, 705 A.2d, at 613. Mr. Gottlieb's admission was revoked on July 3,
1997. See id at 608. Mr. Gottlieb had previously opined on a Philadelphia television station:
"Amy didn't commit a crime." Id. at 6. Mr. Gottlieb lost his appeal of Judge Ridgeley's decision.
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practice in Delaware pro hac vice, had his admission revoked less than three
months before the beginning of his client's criminal trial. This action left
Amy without her attorney of choice in a trial where her life was potentially
at stake.15
Judge Ridgely's dismissal of Mr. Gottlieb raises a troublesome issue.
While the public was conducting its own trial of Amy Grossberg, Mr.
Gottlieb was expected to stand by idly in the face of a gag order and allow
the media to sentence his client before her formal trial began. The court's
gag order directly conflicted with Mr. Gottlieb's duty to zealously represent
the interests of his client. This Comment examines how an attorney's duty
of zealous representation can be reconciled with the courts' potentially
crippling use of gag orders to achieve a fair trial. Part II briefly examines
the constitutionality and application of gag orders. Part III analyzes whether
an attorney's duty to zealously represent a client sometimes necessitates the
violation of gag orders. Part IV discusses the importance of a defendant's
right to counsel of choice, especially in capital punishment cases. Finally,
Part V suggests alternative sanctions judges could impose when attorneys
violate gag orders-sanctions less draconian than removing the defendant's
attorney of choice in a capital punishment case.
II. BACKGROUND ON GAG ORDERS
Public interest in courtroom drama has reached an all-time high.
Interest in the law is no longer confined to the upper echelon of educated
individuals. Sensationalized criminal trials have permeated our popular
culture. There are news programs, magazines, and even a cable television
channel devoted to around-the-clock coverage of legal issues.' 6 The media
provide continuous and up-to-date coverage of cases pending in the
courthouses of America, and there is an abundance of newsworthy crimes to
fuel this coverage. In the wake of O.J. Simpson's "Trial of the Century,'
' 7
See Gottlieb v. State, 697 A.2d 400 (Del. 1997).
15. Delaware's capital punishment laws are among the toughest in the country. Juan Forero,
STAR-LEDGER (Newark, N.J.), Nov. 22, 1996, at 1. Delaware legislators began toughening these
laws in 1991 after a sensational murder-robbery led to public demand for stronger legislation. See
id. Under a 1994 amendment, the intentional slaying of children under the age of 14 by someone
at least four years their senior warrants the death penalty. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §
4209(eX1 )s (1997). Currently, there are 22 separate circumstances that qualify a crime for death.
See id. § 4209(e)(1 )a-v.
16. See Stephen D. Easton, Whose Life Is it Anyway?: A Proposal to Redistribute Some of
the Economic Beenfits of Cameras in the Courtroom from Braodcasters to Crime Victims, 49
S.C. L. REV. 1, 17-18 (1997) (noting the extensive coverage of trials provided by cable television
networks such as CNN and Court TV, as well as television news magazines Inside Edition,
Current Affiar, 48 Hours, and Prime Time Live).
17. See Laurie L. Levenson, Foreword, The Sound of Silence: Reflections on the Use of the
19981
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public interest has been met by the well-publicized case of Theodore
Kaczynski, the "Unabomber,"'" and the trials of Timothy McVeigh, the
"Oklahoma City Bomber,"'19 and Louise Woodward, the "English Nanny.
20
The alleged perpetrators became overnight "celebrities" well before their
trials began. Anyone who watches the news, reads the newspaper, or
discusses current events with friends or acquaintances knows the details of
these heinous crimes. Such intense media scrutiny, however, has a
potentially deleterious effect on the accused's right to a fair trial.
A. Gag Orders: Who Is Bound?
Although an unfair trial is not inevitable in the face of extensive
prejudicial publicity, such publicity can threaten a defendant's chance of
getting a fair trial." Herein lies the conflict between the media's First
Amendment right to free press and a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a
fair trial.22 In an effort to protect a defendant's right to a fair trial by an
impartial jury, some judges issue gag orders.23 Generally, there are two
Gag Order, 17 LoY. L.A. ENT. L.J. 305, 306 n.4 (1997) (noting that there has been at least five
"Trials of the Century" in Los Angeles alone in recent years) (citing Rufo v. Simpson, No.
SC031947, 1997 WL 53038, at *1 (Cal. Super. Ct. Feb. 10, 1997); People v. Simpson, No.
BA097211, 1995 WL 704381 (Cal. Super. Ct. Oct. 3, 1995); People v. Menendez, No.
BA068880, 1996 WL 342092, at *1 (Cal. Super. Ct. July 2, 1996); People v. Williams, 46 Cal.
App. 4th 1767 (Cal. Ct. 1996); United States v. Koon, 833 F. Supp. 769 (C.D. Cal. 1993); People
v. Powell, No. BA035498, (Cal. Sup. Ct. Apr. 29, 1992)).
18. See, e.g., Mark Gladstone, U.S. Indicts Kaczynski Over Fatal Unabomber Attack in New
Jersey, L.A- TIMES, Oct. 2, 1996, at A17.
19. See, e.g., The McVeigh Verdict Case History: It Started at 9:02 am., L.A. TIMEs, June
3, 1997, at A23.
20. See, e.g, Elizabeth Mehren, From British Au Pair to Global Media Darling: Reporters
Focus on Louise Woodward, While Matthew Eappen's Parents Face the Court of Public Opinion,
L.A. TIMEs, Nov. 18, 1997, at E3.
21. See Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 554 (1976).
22. The First Amendment provides, in pertinent part: "Congress shall make no law ...
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press." U.S. CONST. amend. I. The Sixth Amendment
provides that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been
committed." U.S. CONST. amend VI. Scholars often write about the "classic struggle" between an
accused's Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial by an impartial jury with the media's First
Amendment right to free speech and free press. See generally Richard G. Elliott, Jr., Access to
Pretrial Criminal Proceedings: The First Amendment vs. The Sixth Amendment, 15 DEL. LAW.
14 (1997) (discussing the "classic struggle" between two fundamental rights: "[R]ights protecting
the media and rights protecting the accused, a struggle which at the pretrial stage the media usually
win.").
23. Other devices judges may use to mitigate the effects of prejudicial publicity include:
changing the venue of the case; continuing the trial to wait for public interest to subside; rigorous
voir dire of potential jury members; sequestration of the jury, and jury instructions that direct
jurors to disregard inadmissible evidence and to decide the case exclusively upon the facts heard at
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forms of gag orders: (1) gag orders directed at the press; and (2) gag orders
directed at trial participants, such as attorneys, parties and witnesses.24
When obeyed, gag orders effectively bar individuals or entities from
disseminating information about the case to the public and potential jurors.25
Gag orders directed at restricting the media are almost always deemed
26 thunconstitutional prior restraints. As the United States Supreme Court
stated in Nebraska Press Ass 'n v. Stuart,27 "prior restraints on speech and
publication are the most serious and least tolerable infringement[s] on First
Amendment rights. 28  This heavy presumption of invalidity leads many
judges to avoid targeting the press in favor of targeting trial participants,
such as parties and their attorneys. In addition, judges often rely on the
status of attorneys as "officers of the court" to justify stricter regulations of
their conduct both in and out of court.29 Until the Supreme Court
specifically addresses the constitutionality of gag orders on trial participants,
judges can be expected to continue directing these orders toward attorneys
rather than the press.
For instance, Bruce Cutler, defense attorney for organized crime figure
John Gotti, was convicted in a Federal District Court in New York of
criminal contempt for violating a court order prohibiting extrajudicial
statements by lawyers.3° Cutler was the first lawyer to face trial on criminal
trial. See Nebraska Press Ass'n, 427 U.S. 563-64. The effectiveness of these remedies in
assuring a fair trial is outside the scope of this Comment, but usually turns on facts particular to
the case at issue. Judge Ridgely asserted that he had "carefully considered the lesser alternatives
traditionally available" to limit pretrial publicity. See State v. Grossberg, 705 A.2d. 608, 614 (Del.
1997). The judge went on to say:
With the national publicity of this case, a change of venue would serve no purpose.
Nor would postponement of the trial because of the likelihood of continuing
publicity. Neither voir dire nor jury instructions can address in a sufficient way the
threat posed by extrajudicial statements which will materially prejudice the trial.
Id.
24. See Lester Porter, Jr., Note, Leaving Your Speech Rights at the Bar--Gentile v. State
Bar, 111 S. Ct. 2720 (1991), 67 WASH. L. REv. 733, 738 (1992).
25. See Howard D. Hunter, Toward a Better Understanding of the Prior Restraint Doctrine:
A Reply to Professor Mayton, 67 CORNELL L. REv. 283, 288-89 (1982).
26. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Lawyers Have Free Speech Rights, Too: Why Gag Orders on
Trial Participants Are Almost Always Unconstitutional, 17 LOY. L.A. ENT. L.J. 311, 312 (1997)
("Nebraska Press has been treated as an almost complete bar to gag orders on the press."). Id. at
312 n.4.
27. 427 U.S. 539 (1976). In Nebraska Press, the Court reversed the Nebraska Supreme
Court's affirmation, slightly modified, of a lower court's order that restrained the news media from
publishing or broadcasting confessions made by the defendant to law enforcement officers. See id.
at 541-42, 567-70.
28. Id. at 559.
29. See Chemerinsky, supra note 26, at 312.
30. United States v. Cutler, 58 F.3d 825 (2d Cir. 1995) (involving a gag order based on a
local court rule).
1998]
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contempt charges for talking to the media." He spoke repeatedly to the
press at a time when public interest in the case was at its height, despite
numerous admonitions from the judge.32 Cutler was sentenced to ninety
days of house arrest and 600 hours of non-legal community service, and was
suspended from practicing law in the Eastern District of New York for 180
days.
33
Similarly, in the Amy Grossberg case, Judge Ridgely directed his
Order Limiting Pretrial Publicity to trial participants.3 Because restraints
on trial participants are consistently upheld,35 Judge Ridgely's gag order is
most likely a valid means for mitigating the effects of prejudicial pretrial
publicity. However, Judge Ridgely's gag order is problematic because it
was issued after the initial onslaught of prejudicial pretrial publicity. Both
local and national media presented only the graphic and disturbing reports
from police and prosecutors. Thus, the timing of Judge Ridgely's gag order
effectively impeded defense counsel's opportunity to counter the adverse
effects of this negative publicity. Even more problematic was the sanction
Judge Ridgely imposed for violation of his gag order-a violation intended
to "level the playing field" and promote fairness in media coverage.
31. Andrew Blum, Left Speechless: Out of Court, Defense Lawyers Feel a Chilling Breeze,
NAT'L L.J., Jan. 18, 1993, at 1.
32. On December 20, 1990, Judge Glasser "admonished" the parties to comply with the local
rule by "try[ing] the case only in the courtroom and not in the press." Cutler, 58 F.3d at 829.
Immediately following this hearing, Mr. Cutler held a press conference outside the courthouse. Id.
Judge Glasser reiterated his "admonition" to comply with the local rule. Id. Mr. Cutler continued
ignoring these orders by making comments in all major New York dailies, as well as television
shows, such as 60 Minutes. Id. at 830. For the third time, Judge Glasser ordered the parties to
comply with the local rule. Id. To no avail, New York's dailies and television news programs
continued to run stories about Gotti. Id. Finally, Cutler was charged with, and found guilty o,
criminal contempt for violating these orders. Id. at 831-32.
33. Cutler, 58 F.3d at 832.
34. See Order, supra note 8, at 2. The Order reads in relevant part:
(1) Counsel for the State and counsel for Defendants are precluded from public
comment about these cases except in accordance with Rule 3.6 of the Delaware
Lawyers' Rules of Professional Conduct . . . . (3) Counsel for the State and
Defendants shall promptly make all .. .persons assisting or associated with the
prosecutors or defense in these cases aware of this Order.
Id. at 2 (emphasis added). Grossberg's first attorney, Charles M. Oberly III, had agreed that an
order limiting pretrial publicity was necessary to prevent a "substantial likelihood of material
prejudice to the parties' right to a fair trial." Order, supra note 8, at 1. Robert Gottlieb substituted
in as Ms. Grossberg's attorney in May and, by its terms, was bound by the gag order. See id.
35. Marcy Strauss, Sequestration, 24 AM. J. CliM. L. 63, 88 n.108 (1996).
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B. The Relationship of Gag Orders to Trial Publicity Rules
Robert Gottlieb's dismissal was based upon his alleged violation of
Judge Ridgely's gag order. Judge Ridgely's court order instructed parties to
conform with Delaware's Rule of Professional Conduct 3.6 on trial
publicity.36 Delaware's provision is a verbatim adoption of the American
Bar Association's ("ABA") 1983 version of Model Rule 3.6 on trial
publicity.37 The trial publicity rule prohibits a lawyer from making
extrajudicial statements that a "reasonable person would expect to be
disseminated by means of public communication if the lawyer knows or
reasonably should know that it will have a substantial likelihood of
materially prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding" ("substantial likelihood
standard"). 38  The rule also expressly prohibits lawyers from stating their
opinion as to the guilt or innocence of a defendant in a criminal case.3 9
Trial publicity rules, such as Delaware's, do not carry the same heavy
presumption of unconstitutionality as do prior restraints of the press,
although they also operate as anticipatory restrictions on speech.4° The
different presumptions of constitutionality afforded prior restraints and trial
publicity rules flow from the different methods of challenge available under
each speech restriction.41  A party who violates a trial publicity rule is
permitted to challenge the validity of the rule itself.42  Prior restraints,
however, must be challenged before a violation occurs.43 Accordingly, as
trial publicity rules are subject to more generous review than prior restraints,
they are not similarly encumbered by a heavy presumption against their
constitutionality. This allows judges who issue gag orders instructing
attorneys to follow the local trial publicity rule to, in effect, impose
permissible prior restraints on the speech of the parties.
36. See Order, supra note 8, at 1.
37. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.6 (1983).
38. DELAWARE LAWYERS' RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.6(a) (1998).
39. Id. at 3.6(bX4) ("A statement... is ordinarily likely to (have a substantial likelihood of
materially prejudicing a trial if] the statement relates to... any opinion as to the guilt or innocence
of a defendant .... ").
40. Esther Berkowitz-Caballero, Note, In the Aftermath of Gentile: Reconsidering the
Efficacy of TrialPublicity Rules, 68 N.Y.U. L. REv. 494, 548 n.305 (1993) ("Trial publicity rules
differ from prior restraints in that they do not attempt to prevent the articulation of specific speech.
Also, the constitutionality of a trial publicity rule may be challenged by one prosecuted for
violating the rule, whereas prior restraints must be challenged before they are violated.").
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The critical examination a judge is expected to engage in before issuing
a gag order leads some commentators to suggest using gag orders to avoid
the uncertainty associated with Rule 3.6.44 Gag orders can be issued in
individual cases and tailored with the specificity necessary to minimize the
danger of overbreadth. 4  The benefit of using gag orders to prevent
unnecessary chilling of speech is nullified, however, when the terms of the
gag order simply echo those of Rule 3.6. Judge Ridgely took no steps to
narrowly tailor the gag order in Grossberg.46 Instead, he directed counsel to
comply with the local trial publicity rule, which was based on the old Model
Rule 3.6.47
C. The Revision ofModel Rule 3.6
The Supreme Court examined the free speech rights of lawyers in 1991
in the landmark case Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada.4 Although Gentile
did not involve a court order, defense attorney Dominic Gentile was charged
with violating a local Nevada rule fashioned after the ABA's Model Rule on
trial publicity.49 Within hours of his client's indictment, Gentile held a press
conference, stating, "[Tihe evidence will prove... that Grady Sanders is an
innocent person and had nothing to do with any of the charges that are being
leveled against him."5° Gentile claimed that his statements were necessary to
44. See Mark Tuft, Trial Publicity-Before, During and After Trial, 537 PRACTICING L.
INST. 7, 30 (1995) (contrasting broad ethical restrictions to gag orders whereby judges must
"explore alternatives before restraining speech and tailor [gag] orders to the specific circumstances
of each case"); see also Gabriel G. Gregg, ABA Rule 3.6 and California Rule 5-120: A Flawed
Approach to the Problem of Trial Publicity, 43 UCLA L. REv. 1321, 1363-64 (1996) (asserting
that gag orders are the most powerful and effective tools in limiting prejudicial attorney speech);
Porter, supra note 24, at 747 (noting that ad hoc gag orders are less restrictive of speech than
Model Rule 3.6).
In theory, because of the potential chilling effect associated with gag orders, judges are not
to issue gag orders without first considering less restrictive alternatives to curbing the effects of
pretrial publicity. Changes of venue, voir dire, continuances, and jury sequestration are some
procedures judges should consider as alternatives that don't impinge on attorney free speech rights
as severely as gag orders. See Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 563--64 (1976).
When gag orders are finally issued then, it is assumed the issuance was made after serious
consideration of all factors involved. In practice, however, judges can easily issue gag orders with
a stroke of the pen.
45. See Porter, supra note 24, at 747.
46. See Order, supra note 8, at 2.
47. See id.
48. 501 U.S. 1030 (1991).
49. See id. at 1033.
50. Id. at 1059. The local rule in effect at the time prohibited statements of opinion as to the
guilt or innocence of a criminal defendant. Id. at 1061. His client was charged with stealing large
amounts of cocaine and travelers' checks. Id. at 1039. Ultimately, he was indicted. Id. at 1033.
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combat the prejudicial and pervasive publicity surrounding the case during
the period before his client's indictment.5
In a complex opinion, a divided Court upheld the constitutionality of
the "substantial likelihood standard," overturned Gentile's sanctions, and
held Nevada's local rule void for vagueness. 2 Chief Justice William
Rehnquist suggested that lawyer speech in pending cases be regulated under
a standard less demanding than the "clear and present danger" standard
established for regulation of the press in Nebraska Press Ass 'n. In support
of this more relaxed standard, Chief Justice Rehnquist noted the fiduciary
responsibility of attorneys "not to engage in public debate ...that will
obstruct the fair administration of justice."'  Thus, the more deferential
standard espoused by Rehnquist and four other members of the Court rested
on the assumption that attorneys, as opposed to the press, would regulate
themselves. In contrast, Justice Kennedy argued that "substantial
likelihood" must be measured by the same strictures as "clear and present
danger."55  Thus, while nine Justices adopted the "substantial likelihood
standard," the Court could not agree on its meaning. However, because four
Justices joined with the Chief Justice, the speech of lawyers representing
clients in pending cases is regulated by a standard less demanding the the
"clear and present danger" standard. 6
The controversial Gentile decision sparked ABA revisions of Rule 3.6
in 1994.57 While maintaining the "substantial likelihood standard," the ABA
made a number of significant modifications to the previous 1983 version of
Rule 3.6. The amended rule allows lawyers to make statements which a
"reasonable lawyer would believe is required to protect a client from the
substantial prejudicial effect of recent publicity not initiated by the lawyer or
the lawyer's client."58 Due in part to Gentile, this amendment recognizes
situations where it is necessary for lawyers to respond to an adversaries'
public statements in order to assure a fair trial. Two of the modifications
are especially relevant to the Grossberg matter.
51. Id. at 1064.
52. The Nevada local rule contained a "safe harbor" provision that permitted a lawyer to
state, without elaboration, the general nature of the defense. As a result, Gentile was misled into
thinking that he could give his press conference without fear of discipline. Id. at 1048-49.
53. Id. at 1074.
54. Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1074 (quoting Nebraska Press, 427 U.S. at 601 n.27).
55. See id. at 1038-39.
56. See id. at 1074.
57. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.6 (1994).
58. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.6(c) (1994).
19981
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First, the ABA introduced a "right of reply" provision that acts as a
safe harbor within which lawyers may "make a limited response to
particularly egregious publicity without fear of sanction."59 . Although the
language of Rule 3.6 suggests that the right of reply is limited to rebutting
only specific instances of publicity, the provision actually incorporates a
flexible sliding scale standard. 60 Thus, as the level of prejudicial publicity
increases, the scope of response the lawyer is entitled to make will also
increase.
61
Second, the ABA made a subtle change by removing the list of
presumptively prejudicial statements enumerated in Rule 3.6 from the
textual portion of the Rule to the Comment section.62 This change reflects
the ABA's concern that the apparently exhaustive nature of the list, placed
in the text of the Rule, might influence courts to automatically punish
violative statements without determining whether the statements actually had
a prejudicial effect. 63  Delaware's trial publicity rule, however, still
resembles the 1983 version of Rule 3.6 which contains the list of statements
enumerated as enforceable examples of likely violations. 64
Judge Ridgely was overly influenced by the list. Delaware's trial
publicity rule lists "any opinion as to the guilt or innocence of a defendant"
as a statement ordinarily likely to materially prejudice an action.65
Recognizing this, Judge Ridgely stated in his Order to dismiss Gottlieb that
"it is plain [Mr. Gottlieb's statements during the "20/20" interview]
59. Gregg, supra note 44, at 1382 (1996). The Model Rules provide:
A lawyer may make a statement that a reasonable lawyer would believe is required
to protect a client from the substantial undue prejudicial effect of recent publicity not
initiated by the lawyer of the lawyer's client. [Such a] statement... shall be limited
to such information as is necessary to mitigate the recent adverse publicity.
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.6(c) (1994).
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Under the 1983 version of Model Rule 3.6, subsection (b) enumerated several types of
statements which were considered "ordinarily likely" to have a substantial likelihood of materially
prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding. Such statements included those that related to:
(1) "[Tlhe character, credibility, reputation or criminal record of a party, suspect in a
criminal investigation or witness, or the identity of a witness, or the expected
testimony of a party or witness;...
(4) any opinion as to the guilt or innocence of a defendant or suspect in a criminal
case or proceeding that could result in incarceration;
(5) information the lawyer knows or reasonably should know is likely to be
inadmissible as evidence in a trial and would if disclosed create a substantial risk of
prejudicing an impartial trial.
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rules 3.6(b)(1), (4)-(5) (1983).
63. Gregg, supra note 44, at 1380.
64. See DELAWARE LAWYERS' RULE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.6(bX1-5) (1998).
65. DELAWARE LAWYERS' RULE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.6(bX4) (1998).
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convey[ed] his personal opinion as to the innocence of defendant
Grossberg."
Like Mr. Gentile, Mr. Gottlieb also publicly announced the innocence
of his client in order to counter the negative publicity stifling the case.
Although it might be argued that Mr. Gottlieb's contention that Amy was
innocent of the crime had a "substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing
an adjudicative proceeding, ' ,67 it is unlikely that Mr. Gottlieb's statement
actually had such an effect. For most criminal cases, this is because the
public expects such statements to be made by a criminal defendant's
advocate. Therefore, on a practical level, it is ordinarily unlikely that Mr.
Gottlieb's statement would potentially prejudice the potential jury pool in
Amy's favor.
Furthermore, studies suggest that pretrial publicity will usually have
no impact on a juror. For instance, to have an impact, the juror
must be exposed to prejudicial press coverage, that juror must be
biased by the coverage, and the juror must retain the bias against
the defendant from the date the information is published to the
trial date, which may be many months later. Finally, the juror
would have to carry the bias through such safeguards as voir dire
and admonishments from the bench .
The likelihood that attorneys' speech will not prejudice jurors and
trials was underscored by the Court in Mu Min v. Virginia.69 Substantial
publicity surrounded the capital murder trial of Mu'Min, and the media
disseminated details of the crime and numerous items of inadmissible,
prejudicial information in news stories spanning over several months.
Despite eight of the twelve jurors admitting to pretrial publicity exposure,
the Court held that "the publicity did not rise even to a level requiring
questioning of individual jurors about the content of publicity." 70 Similarly,
it is doubtful that Mr. Gottlieb's abbreviated, general comments made three
months before trial, rose to the level of creating a "substantial likelihood of
materially prejudicing" the case.71
66. Order, supra note 8, at 11.
67. DELAWARE LAWYERS' RULEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.6(a) (1998).
68. Elliott, supra note 22, at 16-17.
69. 500 U.S. 415 (1991).
70. Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, 501 U.S. 1030, 1039 (1991) (distinguishing the case
from the Court's Mu'Mn decision).
71. 1d.
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D. Unequal Enforcement of Gag Orders
The Grossberg case illustrates the growing problem of unequal
enforcement of gag orders. The problem lies in the language of statutes
based on the former Model Rule 3.6 that allowed the broad, discretionary
application of the amorphous "substantial likelihood of material prejudice"
standard.72 As Justice Kennedy wrote in Gentile, the standard's imprecision
creates the potential for selective enforcement that is of "particular relevance
when one of the classes most affected by the regulation is the criminal
defense bar, which has the professional mission to challenge actions of the
State. "73
For example, defense attorney Gentile was disciplined for holding a
press conference, but the prosecutor was not disciplined for holding his own
press conference. 74 Similarly, Judge Ridgely dismissed defense attorney
Gottlieb for violating the gag order, while he ruled that prosecutor Peter
LeTang did not violate the gag order when he granted an interview to a
newspaper.75  The inequality of these decisions is amplified because Mr.
LeTang granted the interview after Gottlieb's dismissal, and knowing of the
possible consequences. But, Mr. LeTang was not punished in any way even
though his conduct flew in the face of Judge Ridgely's order. Such
discriminatory enforcement paves the way for judicial abuse, which is
especially dangerous and objectionable when a defendant faces the death
penalty. Failure of judges to avoid furthering the inequity of gag order
enforcement may very well lead to continued and purposeful violations of
gag orders by defense attorneys as the need to balance harmful publicity
increases.
72. See Berkowitz-Caballero, supra note 40, at 530. ("Fundamentally, the standard affords
judges too much discretion to determine which comments, under what conditions, would create a
substantial likelihood of material prejudice.").
73. Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1051.
74. See Berkowitz-Caballero, supra note 40, at 531.
75. Most, supra note 2, at A3. In response to a motion by Grossberg's defense counsel, John
S. Malik, seeking sanctions of Mr. LeTang or, in the alternative, reinstatement of Mr. Gottlieb as
Grossberg's lead attorney, Judge Ridgely decided that a hearing on the motion was "plainly
unnecessary." Id. The judge called for an end to the accusatory pleadings. See id.
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III. ZEALOUS REPRESENTATION
A. A Presumption of What?
Theoretically, under our legal system, defendants are presumed
innocent until proven guilty. In reality, and particularly with highly
publicized cases, it often seems that defendants are cloaked with a
presumption of guilt until proven innocent.
Media coverage of a high-profile criminal trial characteristically
unfolds as follows: (1) the media learns of the occurrence of a sensational
murder; (2) the public learns of the murder through media reports; (3) the
police and prosecutors begin issuing statements regarding the facts and
circumstances surrounding the murder; (4) a suspect is officially charged
with the murder; (5) the media runs stories about who the suspect is, what
the suspect looks like, the suspect's occupation and family life, and the
suspect's alleged role in the murder; (6) the public devours this new
information voraciously; and (7) the judge presiding over the case issues a
gag order in an attempt to protect the defendant and prevent more prejudicial
information from reaching the potential jury pool.
Often, a gag order benefits a defendant because the flow of damaging
information is arrested. In the case of Amy Grossberg, however, prejudicial
information continued to flow because the media, immune from the gag
order, continued their stories on Amy Grossberg and her allegedly
murderous conduct. The details of Amy's alleged acts became engrained in
the minds of the public as news entities insisted on referring to Amy each
time a new story of a teenage girl abandoning her newborn was told.76
Reporters relayed the stories as if child abandonment or infanticide was
raging throughout young America as a new epidemic, with Amy having been
the original carrier.
Prosecutor LeTang and Amy's original lead attorney, Charles Oberly
III, both agreed that a gag order would be necessary to promote a fair trial.
It is doubtful, however, that Mr. Oberly would have agreed to a gag order
76. See, e.g., Woman Leaves Newborn in Toilet, YoRK DAILY REC., July 15, 1997 (reporting
that a 16-year-old girl who gave birth while sitting on a bus terminal toilet, then walked away and
left the baby for dead). Another young woman horrified millions as she allegedly gave birth at her
high school prom, leaving the baby for dead in a trash can, and then returning minutes later to the
dance floor. See Margaret Carlson, Prom Nightmare; A Dead Baby in the Wastebasket, A Debate
Gone Away, TDIE, June 23, 1997, at 42. In another case, a USC student allegedly gave birth in
her dormitory room, leaving the newborn for dead in a campus dumpster. See Barbara Ehrenreich,
Where Have All the Babies Gone?, LIFE, Jan. 1998, at 68.
1998]
642 LOYOLA OFLOSANGELES ENTERTAINMENT LAWJOUR NAL [Vol.18
had he known the media would continue to fuel the fire against his client and
that he would be powerless to extinguish it. Mr. Oberly could not have
foreseen the rash of teenagers disposing of their babies in ways reminiscent
of Amy's alleged acts and the subsequent reporting by the media. The sheer
magnitude of continuing negative publicity surrounding the Grossberg case
was unpredictable. It is all the more compelling that Amy chose Mr.
Gottlieb to represent her because he would be qualified to protect her from
the media's accusations. Thus, when 20/20 requested an interview, it was
arguably a necessary action by Mr. Gottlieb to take; the best one in his
client's interests.
B. An Indictment Isn't Just an Indictment Anymore
Technically, an indictment is "a public statement by a prosecutor that
the government has amassed enough evidence to try a suspect for a crime. '77
The public often perceives an indictment as a strong indication of a
suspect's guilt. In such an atmosphere, effective representation may dictate
that counsel defend a client not only against formal charges in court, but
also against the "frequently more debilitating innuendo and unsubstantiated
charges made in the media., 78  Moreover, when an indictment is well-
publicized, it is unjust to require silence on the part of defense attorneys.
Defense lawyers often face an uphill battle to reinstate their clients'
constitutionally guaranteed presumption of innocence. Speaking to the
media is frequently their weapon of choice.
A defendant's presumption of innocence is difficult to sustain in light
of official police and coroner reports. When these reports are coupled with
frequent leaks to the press of information potentially prejudicial to
defendants, it follows that a defense attorney should have media access to
publicly promote his or her client's innocence. 79 Without such access, the
defense attorney operates at a disadvantage, despite the prosecutor's burden
of proof. Uncontested, a potential jury pool enters the judgment process
knowing only the facts supporting an indictment in a very public and
sensationalized case.
Still, the mere issuance of an indictment does not justify a lawyer's
violation of the gag order. The system contains "judicial and constitutional
protections designed to counteract the 'presumption of guilt' that the
indictment may engender."80  The judicial and constitutional protections
77. Berkowitz-Caballero, supra note 40, at 532.
78. Id. at 533.
79. Id. at 534.
80. Kevin Cole & Fred C. Zacharias, The Agony of Victory and the Ethics of Lawyer Speech,
GAG ORDERS AND THE ULTIMATE SANCTION
include the prosecutor's burden of proof and the defendant's privilege
against self-incrimination.8 When public interest in a case is intensified,
however, these protections are not sufficient to preserve a defendant's right
to a fair trial.
C. What Constitutes "Zeal?"
A defense attorney's primary duty is to represent their clients zealously
within the bounds of the law.82 The concept of "zealous representation,"
however, is not clearly defined. Equally vague is the "within the bounds of
law" limitation. The ambiguity causes defense attorneys to continually
confront the dilemma of whether to forego measures beneficial to their
clients or to engage in potentially criminal conduct.83
Attorneys, like Mr. Gottlieb, must weigh the risk of conducting
themselves according to their best judgment to help their clients against the
adverse consequences that could flow from taking such actions.84 Some
lawyers even believe they have an ethical obligation to engage in "borderline
conduct" when they believe that their intended conduct is ultimately lawful
and beneficial to the client.8" Moreover, criminal defendants may doubt their
attorneys' commitment to their cause if they take a passive stance to the
prosecutor's more aggressive undertaking of the case.86
Judicially imposed limitations on what attorneys may permissibly do to
further their clients' interests complicate the ability of defense attorneys to
effectively carry out the duty of zealous representation. The gravity of a
case should influence "both the scope of permissible advocacy and what
lapses of decorum are excusable. 87 Attorneys fighting to keep their clients
69 S. CAL. L. REv. 1627, 1650 (1996).
81. Id.
82. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Rule EC 7-1 (1985).
83. See Bruce A. Green, Zealous Representation Bound: The Intersection of the Ethical
Codes and the Criminal Law, 69 N.C. L. REv. 687, 689 (1991) (asserting that '[t]he ethical codes
give no guidance as to whether the duty of 'zealous representation' requires an attorney to engage
in conduct approaching the line of criminality, whether an attorney must refrain from such
conduct, or whether an attorney has discretion to choose his course of conduct"); see also Cole &
Zacharias, supra note 80, at 1628 n.6 (noting that "[tIhe typical adversarial view of lawyers is that
they generally should engage in whatever legal behavior will benefit their clients because doing so
enhances client trust, promotes the sharing of confidences and improves the lawyers' contribution
to truth seeking in an adversary system").
84. See Green, supra note 83, at 707.
85. Id. at 709.
86. See Cole & Zacharias, supra note 80, at 1651.
87. Louis S. Raveson, Advocacy and Contempt-Part 11: Charting the Boundaries of
Contempt: Ensuring Adequate Breathing Room for Advocacy, 65 WASH. L. REv. 743, 823
(1990) [hereinafter Raveson, Part II].
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from being executed or sentenced to death row should be permitted greater
leeway of advocacy without fear of contempt, than counsel challenging
traffic tickets or even armed robberies.88 In the Grossberg matter, it follows
that Mr. Gottlieb should have been afforded the greatest latitude in his
advocacy efforts on behalf of Amy. Instead, he was removed prematurely at
the outset of the case as a result of statements made within the scope of his
zealous representation.89
IV. DEFENDANT'S RIGHTS
A. Defendant's Right to Private Counsel
Under due process requirements, criminal defendants are
constitutionally guaranteed the right to effective counsel. 90 This right
encompasses the right to choose private counsel which in turn, necessarily
implicates a right to choose the most effective, zealous advocate available
rather than a passive defense attorney. 9' After all, the rights delineated in
the Sixth Amendment were meant to "equalize the balance of power in the
criminal process by granting the defendant an indispensable shield against
the natural advantage the prosecution enjoys in a criminal trial." 92
Considering the high stakes involved in a capital punishment trial when
a case is bombarded with intense media coverage, the case should be treated
differently from other criminal trials. As Justice Clark stated in Irvin v.
Dowd, "With his life at stake, it is not requiring too much that petitioner be
tried in an atmosphere undisturbed by so huge a wave of public
passion . . . .9' It is also "not requiring too much" to permit capital
defendants, like Amy Grossberg, to be represented by an attorney in whom
they have confidence and trust. Indeed, the purpose of the effective
assistance guarantee, as stated in Strickland v. Washington,94 is to ensure a
fair trial for defendants. After much consideration, the Grossbergs chose
Mr. Gottlieb as lead counsel perhaps because they believed he would
provide her with a solid defense and ensure a fair trial, despite the
88. Id. at 824.
89. See discussion supra note 10.
90. See Reece v. Georgia, 350 U.S. 85, 90 (1955) (holding that the right to counsel means the
right to effective assistance of counsel).
91. See generally Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 69-70 (1942).
92. Alfredo Garcia, The Right to Counsel Under Siege: Requiem for an Endangered
Right?, 29 AM. CRiM. L. REv. 35, 36 (1991).
93. Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 728 (1960).
94. 466 U.S. 668, 689 (1984).
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heightened public passion surrounding her case. However, a defendant's
right to retain an attorney of choice is not absolute. 95 The defendant's
freedom to choose counsel is limited by a court's power to balance the
defendant's right to retain counsel of choice against the interests of judicial
integrity and efficiency. 9' This power allows the court to restrict a
defendant's right to accept appointed counsel or to disqualify retained
counsel.9 7 Where the death penalty is involved, however, judges should not
have the authority to dismiss counsel without substantial cause, and should
be subjected to the strictest appellate review.
A defendant's choice of counsel, even one admitted pro hac vice,
cannot be denied arbitrarily.98 The right to choose counsel gives defendants
the ability to select an attorney they believe will best represent their interest,
thereby preserving the integrity of the criminal proceedings. 99 This aspect of
the right to counsel also respects the individual defendant's interest, as a
matter of personal autonomy, in making critical decisions concerning the
course of the criminal defense. 1°
B. Right to a Genuinely Fair Trial
All criminal defendants have the right to be tried by an impartial
jury. 101 In Sheppard v. Maxwell,10 2 the Supreme Court reversed a conviction
because the press had shown no responsible concern for the constitutional
guarantee of a fair trial.'0 3 Further, the Court stated that:




98. See United States v. Alvarez, 816 F.2d 813 (1st Cir. 1987) (deciding that defendant's
rights had been violated because he did not have pro hac vice counsel of choice); see also In re
Cooper, 821 F.2d 833, 843 (1st Cir. 1987) (stating that "due deliberation should be given before
taking the extraordinary step of depriving Cooper of his counsel of choice"); Cooper v. Hutchinson,
184 F.2d 119, 123 (3d Cir. 1950) (holding that arbitrary removal of counsel admitted pro hac vice
would deprive accused of his constitutional rights).
99. See Bruce A. Green, Lethal Fiction: The Meaning of "Counsel" in the Sixth
Amendnent, 78 lowA L. REv. 433, 441-42 (1993).
100. Id.
101. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. This provision provides, in relevant part, that "[in all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel." U.S.
CONST. amend. VI.
102. 384 U.S. 333 (1966).
103. Id. Samuel Sheppard, a doctor, was charged with bludgeoning his pregnant wife to
death in their home. See id. at 335-36. Three days after the murder, newspapers began running
headlines about this story. Id. at 338. These stories focused on Sheppard's reluctance to take lie
detector tests, his rumored extramarital affairs, and inconsistent recollection of events on the night
of the murder. See id. at 338-42. By the time trial began, the Sheppard case had been covered
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Due process requires that the accused receive a trial by an
impartial jury free from outside influences. Given the
pervasiveness of modem communications and the difficulty of
effacing prejudicial publicity from the minds of the jurors, the
trial courts must take strong measures to ensure that the balance
is never weighed against the accused.'°4
There are vital social interests served by the free dissemination of
information, and attorneys are often the only people in a position to provide
the public with accurate, critical, and timely information about the criminal
justice process. If there were no limits on the flow of information, the
protective effect of legal decorum would be effectively nullified. 10 5 Gag
orders that act as broad restrictions on speech, however, don't serve the
purpose of protecting legal decorum. Instead, they operate to prevent
defendants and their counsel from engaging in public response to negative
press and in turn, from participating in a fair trial.' 6 On the other hand, gag
orders, habitually enforced against capital defendants after the prosecution
has had its opportunity to publicly address its position, operate to nullify a
defendant's right to a fair trial.
C. Opportunity for Interlocutory Appeal
Mr. Gottlieb was not given an appeal of his dismissal.' 0 7 Gottlieb had
filed a motion asking Judge Ridgely to reconsider his ruling, but Ridgely
denied the motion.)18 Mr. Gottlieb subsequently appealed to the Delaware
Supreme Court, requesting a review of Judge Ridgely's decision.' 9 The
court declared that it lacked jurisdiction to hear an appeal of the
"interlocutory order" revoking Gottlieb's pro hac vice admission to practice
in Delaware.1°
extensively by newspapers, radio, and television broadcasts as circulation-conscious editors catered
to the insatiable interest of the American public in murder, mystery, society, sex, and suspense. Id.
at 356.
104. Id. at 362.
105. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.6 cmt. 1 (1994).
106. See Kenneth Jost, Judges Should Gag the Gag Order, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Aug.
5, 1991, at 19.
107. See Gottlieb v. State, 697 A.2d 400, 404 (Del. 1997).
108. See Matthew Futterman, Judge in Grossberg Trial Stands His Ground, STAR-LEDGER
(Newark, N.J.), July 9, 1997, at 32.
109. See Gottlieb v. State, 697 A.2d 400 (Del. 1997).
110. See id at 400. An interlocutory order is one made during the progresss of a case and
does not finally determine the outcome of an action. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 815 (6th ed.
1990).
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Pursuant to Article IV, section 11 of the Delaware Constitution, the
Delaware Supreme Court has limited jurisdiction over appeals in criminal
cases."' Interlocutory appeals from criminal cases are not included within
the scope of court's jurisdiction. 1 2  Instead, the Delaware Supreme Court
only has jurisdiction over interlocutory appeals from trial court orders in
civil actions, those from the Court of Chancery, and Orphans' Court." 3
Although there is no constitutional right to an appeal," 4 there are
numerous benefits to the appeals process. Importantly, appeals operate as
safeguards to ensure correct factual and legal decisions. 5 Perhaps more
significantly, appeals serve to provide equitable results to parties who would
otherwise be bound by unreviewable decisions. 116 These policies are equally
applicable to interlocutory appeals. 117
Arguments disfavoring appeals of interlocutory orders are unavailing
when balanced against the benefits of appeal. Standard concerns include
increasing the caseload of reviewing courts, diminishing respect for trial
level judges by institutionalizing mechanisms to second-guess their
decisions, and delaying trial court proceedings." 8 Such concerns are even
less substantial when considered in light of a capital punishment case
involving the permanent deprivation of a defendant's counsel of choice. A
judge's concern for his or her own reputation should yield to a defendant's
concern for fairness.
In addition to its claim that it lacked jurisdiction to consider an
interlocutory appeal of Judge Ridgely's order, the Gottlieb court set forth
111. See DEL. CONST. art. IV, § 11 (1Xb)-(c).
112. See Gottlieb, 697 A.2d at 400.
113. See DEL. CONST. art. IV, §§ 11 (IXa), (4), (5).
114. See Evits v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 393 (1985).
115. See Michael E. Solimine, Revitalizing Interlocutory Appeals in the Federal Courts, 58
GEo. WASH. L. REv. 1165, 1175 (1990).
116. See id. (citing J. Harvie Wilkinson III, The Role of Reason in the Rule of Law, 56 U.
Cmn. L. REv. 779, 799 (1989) (contending that "the justification for appeals is not necessarily the
'correct' result they may produce, but their tendency to encourage reasoned judgment by
subjecting it to reexamination")).
117. See id.
118. See id. at 1178. Mr. Solimine considers these criticisms against interlocutory review
unconvincing. First, he suggests that an increase in interlocutory appeals may result in a
corresponding decrease in a court system's overall caseload. See id. Dispositions of intermediate
decisions at the appellate level may lead to quicker resolution of cases at the trial level. See id.
Various restrictions could also govern the interlocutory process to minimize the impact on valuable
judicial resources. For instance, limitations could be imposed on the time allowed for oral
arguments and page restrictions for party briefs. See id. Second, he points out appeals which
affirm trial judge decisions could increase the respect afforded trial judges. See id. at 1178-79.
Finally, the potential delays engendered by appellate review are worth it if the ultimate benefits of
review are achieved. See id.
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additional reasons supporting its decision not to review the order. Quite
troubling, the court noted that nothing about the disqualification order
distinguished itself from "the run of pretrial decisions that affect the right of
criminal defendants yet must await completion of trial court proceedings for
review."'1 9 Apparently, the court did not place a high premium on
Grossberg's right to counsel of choice.
Furthermore, the court averred that the validity of a disqualification
could not be adequately reviewed until the completion of the trial. 20 At that
point, the effect of the disqualification on the defense would be known.
12'
Such reasoning is puzzling. For all the emphasis placed on avoiding delay
of trial and conservation of judicial resources, Delaware's interlocutory
process, or lack of, is curious. If it were determined, at the conclusion of a
trial, that the disqualification did affect the outcome, a mistrial might be
entered, and the entire process of trying Grossberg would be repeated.
Similarly, after Judge Ridgely dismissed Gottlieb from the matter, he
delayed Grossberg's trial for several months to allow her to retain other
counsel. 122  During this time, the Delaware Supreme Court could have
rendered a decision as to whether Gottlieb's dismissal was appropriate. If it
was deemed improper, Gottlieb could resume representation in the case. If
not, the trial would be delayed a few months; not too unlike a party
requesting a continuance.
Without any means of appeal, Gottlieb was effectively shut out of the
case by the same judge who issued the order and decided there had been a
violation. At a minimum, the contempt hearing should have been referred to
another judge. However, the Delaware Constitution affords the supreme
court one other avenue by which it could have possibly heard Gottlieb's
appeal. Article IV, Section 11(9) gives the supreme court jurisdiction "[t]o
hear and determine questions of law certified to it by other Delaware
courts .. .where it appears to the Supreme Court that there are important
and urgent reasons for an immediate determination of such questions by
it.''12' The Delaware Supreme Court has the authority to prescribe the
methods of certification and the conditions under which certification would
be appropriate.124 By the terms of this provision, Gottlieb's situation seems




122. See Matthew Futterman, Judge Delays Grossberg Trial Until May '98: New Jersey
Attorneys in Baby-Killing Case Need Time, STAR-LEDGER (Newark, N.J.), Sept. 4, 1997, at 24.
123. DEL. CONST. art. IV, § 11(9).
124. See id.
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to be a prime candidate for the supreme court to have considered it for
certification. Hearing Gottlieb's appeal certainly qualifies as an "important
and urgent" reason deserving immediate determination. Further, the court
would be rendering a decision on a question of law: whether the revocation
of Gottlieb's pro hac vice admission was justified. Nonetheless, the
Delaware Supreme Court passed on the opportunity to review Judge
Ridgely's order. 25
Delaware, and states with similar treatment of criminal interlocutory
appeals, should take notice of North Carolina legislation allowing appeals
that affect a "substantial right" which would be lost absent a review prior to
final determination. Essentially, North Carolina implements a two-part test:
(1) the right itself must be substantial; and (2) the party's case would
potentially suffer in the absence of this right.126 North Carolina does not
base its appeals process on the finality of the interlocutory order. 127 Instead,
it looks at whether or not counsel had been properly admitted to practice
before the interlocutory order was issued.1 21 Once attorneys are properly
admitted pro hac vice, their clients are deemed to have acquired a
substantial right to the continuation of representation by that attorney.1 29
In Goldston v. American Motors Corp.,3' an order revoking counsel's
pro hac vice admission was reversed because it affected the client's
substantial right to continued representation of her counsel of choice.
Plaintiff's attorney, R. Ben Hogan, was properly admitted to practice, and
was also an alleged expert in the products liability area."' The court
determined that not allowing the client to be represented by Hogan would be
detrimental to her substantial right, largely because of Hogan's expertise and
knowledge in the field of automobiles. 32  Mr. Gottlieb's circumstances
parallel that of Hogan. He was carefully chosen by the Grossbergs to lead
Amy's case, and he had been properly admitted to practice in Delaware.
Furthermore, this case involves the death penalty. Conceivably, it can be
conceded that Gottlieb's removal and inability to represent Amy would
constitute an impairment of a substantial right.
125. See Gottlieb v. State, 697 A.2d 400 (Del. 1997).
126. See Goldston v. American Motors Corp., 392 S.E.2d 735 (N.C. 1990) (quoting
Wachovia Realty Invs. v. Housing, Inc., 232 S.E.2d 667 (N.C. 1977)).
127. See id. at 737.
128. See id.
129. See id.
130. 392 S.E.2d 735 (N.C. 1990).
131. See Goldston, 392 S.E.2d at 737.
132. See id.
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V. ALTERNATIVE SANCTIONS
As the Grossberg matter illustrates, a court's inherent power to punish
misconduct by criminal contempt often conflicts with a defendant's Sixth
Amendment right to vigorous legal representation) 33 Therefore, a court
must balance its need for order and decorum against a defendant's right to
vigorous representation. 1 4 In their attempt to strike this balance, judges
must consider the relative weight of these needs, especially when a defendant
requires zealous advocacy to stay alive.
A. Background on Contempt
Judges possess great latitude in fixing punishments for violations of
their court orders. For instance, to punish improper extrajudicial comments
by attorneys, judges may use their contempt of court powers.
35
Punishments include monetary fines, reprimands, suspension, disbarment,
and incarceration. Criminal contempt serves a dual purpose. One purpose
is to "protect the court's reputation and ability to administer justice.' 36
Criminal contempt also serves to punish the wrongdoer for past disobedience
of a court order.'37 In contrast, the primary function of civil contempt is to
"coerce compliance with a court order.' 138
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 42 identifies two types of criminal
contempt dispositions. Pursuant to Rule 42(a), a judge may summarily
order criminal contempt if the judge observes the objectionable conduct
during court.' 9 Rule 42(b) allows for a contempt disposition only after
133. See Louis S. Raveson, Advocacy and Contempt: Constitutional Limitations on the
Judicial Contempt Power, Part I: The Conflict Between Advocacy and Contempt, 65 WASH L.
REv. 477, 477 (1990) (hereinafter Raveson, Part I].
134. Id. at 478-80.
135. See H. Morley Swingle, Warning: Pretrial Publicity May Be Hazardous to Your Bar
License, 50 J. Mo. B. 335, 337-38 (1994).
136. THE JUDICIAL RESPONSE TO LAWYER MISCONDUCT art. I(A) (ABA Standing Committee
on Professional Discipline ed., 1984) [hereinafter JUDICIAL RESPONSE].
137. MANUAL ON RECURRING PROBLEMS IN CRIMINAL TRIALS, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER,
51 (Genevra K. Loveland & Kris Markarian eds., 4th ed. 1996) [hereinafter MANUAL ON
RECURRING PROBLEMS].
138. Id. Contemnors are not entitled to an indictment or jury trial before civil contempt
sanctions are imposed. See Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S. 364, 365 (1996) (providing no
right to jury trial or indictment because of conditional nature of civil contempt). Contemnors are
entitled to minimal due process protections, such as notice and the opportunity to be heard. See
James Oleske, Authority of the Trial Judge, 84 GEO. L.J. 1179, 1189 (1996).
139. FED. R. CRIM. P. 42(a).
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fundamental due process requirements, such as notice and a hearing, are
provided to the alleged contemnor."
The process of summary contempt is "reserved for exceptional
circumstances" since the alleged contemnor is not afforded fundamental due
process requirements.141 Thus, summary contempt is usually invoked only
when immediate action is necessary to "restore order and maintain the
dignity and authority of the court.' ' 142 Furthermore, there must be an actual
disruption of judicial order before an attorney can be found guilty of
summary contempt. 143
Summary contempt is rarely used because of the various restrictions
imposed on its use. Thus, judges rely on Rule 42(b) to punish contemptuous
behavior.144 Common use of 42(b), however, has trivialized the due process
protections guaranteed to a defendant. Theoretically, judges must exercise
their contempt power with care to avoid arbitrary and oppressive
conclusions. 45 Practically, however, the wide discretionary latitude allows
judges to order contempt swiftly. Notice of a contempt hearing and an
opportunity to be heard at this hearing may technically satisfy the
requirements for the record, but the ease with which contempt can be
ordered suggests that judges may not really afford defendants due process
protections.
It is well established that a judge has the power to suspend an attorney
from practice before that court.' 46 Such power, however, "ought to be
exercised with great moderation and judgment. . 147 In the exercise of his
discretion, Judge Ridgely "[chose] to go no further than [a] public
reprimand."' 14  His public reprimand, however, consisted of dismissing
Robert Gottlieb from the case and revoking his pro hac vice admission to
practice in Delaware."49
Robert Gottlieb's conduct in the Grossberg case does not parallel, nor
even resemble that of Bruce Cutler, the attorney who knowingly and
repeatedly acted in blatant disregard of court order. Mr. Gottlieb had not
been censured in the past, nor had he been warned. He had been approached
140. Id. 42(b).
141. MANUAL ON RECURRING PROBLEMS, supra note 137, at 63.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 65.
144. See id. at 63.
145. See id. at 57.
146. In re Sarelas, 360 F. Supp. 794, 795 (N.D. 111. 1973) (suspending an attorney from
practice for two years for filing frivolous and defamatory litigation).
147. Id. (quoting Exparte Burr, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 529, 529-30 (1824)).
148. See State v. Grossberg, 705 A.2d 608, 613 (Del. 1997).
149. See id.
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by 20/20 to do an interview, and like Mr. Gentile, who ultimately was not
sanctioned, Mr. Gottlieb proceeded believing he was acting in conformance
with the court order. Therefore, Mr. Gottlieb should not have been
summarily dismissed from the case.
In fact, there are numerous alternatives Judge Ridgely could have
imposed at the contempt proceeding. For example, a monetary fine, which is
a common punishment imposed in contempt cases, would have served the
purpose of preventing further prejudice to the case. If a monetary fine did
not sufficiently deter Mr. Gottlieb from making future public statements,
Judge Ridgely could have imposed a jail sentence to commence immediately
after his representation of Amy concluded. Also, a disciplinary action
against Mr. Gottlieb could have been requested. 50 Thus, there are a myriad
of contempt options Judge Ridgely could have used short of the debilitating
and highly prejudicial sanction of removing a capital defendant's lead
counsel.
B. In the Court's Discretion
Currently, the "ad hoc and sporadic treatment of individual instances
of contempt makes the limits [of vigorous advocacy] uncertain, producing
substantial self-censorship" of otherwise zealous attorneys.' Courts
possess a virtually unrestrained power to punish attorneys for contempt, and
they frequently exercise this power arbitrarily. 52  Emanating from the
amorphous and undefined "substantial likelihood standard," the contempt
power is utilized idiosyncratically by judges to enforce whatever subjective
level of order, decorum, and respect they deem appropriate.5 3 In all
150. The contempt power is distinguishable from the use of the disciplinary process in that
the latter's purpose is to protect the public from lawyers who are unable to "properly discharge
their professional duties." JUDICIAL RESPONSE, supra note 136, art. I(BXI.1). Resolutions of
disciplinary actions often include suspension and disbarment above and beyond removal from a
single case. See, e.g., Preface to STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING LAWYER SANCTIONS 10 (ABA ed.
1991).
151. Raveson, Part I, supra note 133, at 483.
152. See Raveson, Part II, supra note 87, at 744.
153. The power of a court to summarily punish any infraction of their orders has ancient
origins and is generally deemed vital to independence of the judiciary. A recent study reports,
however, that
[V]iolations of orders against public disclosure committed outside the courtroom...
should not be dealt with summarily. With respect to punishment, an asserted
contempt of court outside the presence of the court, whether the contempt is civil or
criminal, should be subject, like defiance of any other duly constituted authority, to
indictment and to trial, preferably by jury, before a judge wholly uninvolved in the
controversy.
RIGHTS IN CONFLICT: REPORT OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND, TASK FORCE ON JUSTICE,
PUBLICITY, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 21 (1976) (emphasis removed).
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likelihood, the disposition of one matter may turn on the mood of the judge
during that particular court session. This use of the contempt power, and
even the threat of its use, have a potential chilling effect on lawyers'
advocacy.- 4 For fear of being held in contempt, lawyers may censor
themselves at the expense of their clients. Alternatively, lawyers may, in the
course of advocating their client's interests, be literally prevented from
representing their clients, as was Mr. Gottlieb who got dismissed from the
Grossberg case. Therefore, ill-considered use of the contempt power
ultimately manifests as an obstacle to the court's ability to fairly administer
justice. This is because judicial action which curtails the vigorousness of
counsel is likely to prejudice the rights of criminal defendants and
impermissibly tilt the scales of justice. 155
C. Guidelines for Imposing Sanctions
Courts tend to apply the age-old balancing test between the court's
need for decorum and respect with the client's need for vigorous advocacy.
However, a purely ad hoc approach to this balancing results in unacceptably
arbitrary and unpredictable impositions of sanctions for gag order violations.
Clearer guidelines are needed to prevent abuses of judicial discretion and an
undue chilling effect of vigorous advocacy. The factually driven analyses of
determining whether or not contempt was committed in a particular case has
infected this area of the law with an arbitrariness that often borders on
discretionary abuse. 5 6 Even courts which recognize the value of advocative
expression and the need to minimize the chilling effect on vigorous
representation have failed to develop any meaningful mechanism for
handling contempt cases. Instead, some courts continue to take advantage of
the broad discretion they possess in this area. Although the power of lower
courts to fashion remedies for contempt is limited to sanctions narrowly
tailored to achieve the proposed end, many courts are faltering in this
responsibility.
5 7
154. See Raveson, Part I, supra note 133, at 487.
155. See id. at 489-90.
156. Raveson, Part I, supra note 87, at 769. Legal experts noted that Ridgely might not
have imposed the ultimate sanction if Gottlieb had shown remorse for allowing the interview.
Doug Most, Grossberg Begs for Return of Lawyer, RECORD (Bergen County, N.J.), July 8, 1997,
at Al. Instead of apologizing for allowing the interview, Gottlieb maintained he was unaware of
the gag order in effect. See id.
157. See United States v. Wilson, 421 U.S. 309, 319 (1975) (adhering to the principle that
"only '[t]he least possible power adequate to the end proposed' should be used in contempt cases")
(quoting Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204, 231 (1821)).
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The current confusion in this area suggests that the time has arrived for
the Supreme Court to address this dilemma and provide courts with more
guidance. Accepting an appeal of Mr. Gottlieb's case would provide them
with a concrete foundation from which to begin.
The Supreme Court should attempt to formulate a clear and
unambiguous definition of the "substantial likelihood standard" to lend
objectivity to the contempt process establish a uniform interpretation
throughout the lower courts of all the States. The Court should also impose
stricter requirements for judges to satisfy before they can issue gag orders.
For example, a court may grant a continuance of a case to allow the initial
horror of a crime and intense emotions to diminish over time. In cases where
gag orders are appropriate, there should be an additional requirement that
the order specify what punishments may be imposed upon violation, thus
reserving to the courts the option to summarily remove counsel for an initial,
yet particularly egregious violation. Finally, appeals from criminal
contempt charges should be adjudicated before a judge other than the one
presiding when the misconduct occurred or the judge whose order was
violated.
Even considering these guidelines, application of the contempt power
with great precision is likely to remain uncertain. The variables involved are
numerous and probably impossible to recount exhaustively. Although it
remains difficult for an attorney to know with certainty whether specific
behavior will be deemed contemptuous, zealous representation can only be
shielded from the court's arbitrary power, unless the Court fashions a safe
harbor, similar to the one provided in revised Model Rule 3.6, for necessary
advocative expression." Thus, a procedure permitting criminal
interlocutory appeals should be implemented as a check on trial judges' use
of their contempt power. Recognizing the disadvantages associated with
interlocutory appeals, such as the potential conflict with speedy resolution of
criminal cases, a narrow exception can be made with regard to capital
punishment cases.
VI. CONCLUSION
Until the Supreme Court takes action, it is imperative that the lower
courts rethink the parameters of their role in the trial process. They should
be mindful of two things. First, defendants, especially capital defendants
ignorant of the law, should not be punished for their attorneys' misconduct.
Certainly, Amy and her family would not have granted the 20/20 interview if
158. Id. at 837.
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they had known that it would adversely affect her cause)5 9 They should not
be charged with the same knowledge as their attorney.
Second, judges should keep in mind that arbitrary use of the contempt
power as a means to command respect for the courts has the potential to
backfire. 16 Instead of generating respect for the courts, disrespect is certain
to follow if the public realizes that the judiciary's demand for decorum
stifles zealous representation on behalf of defendants.1 6' Ultimately, the
legitimacy of the entire criminal process will suffer.162On April 22, 1998,
less than two weeks before her trial was to begin, Amy Grossberg pleaded
guilty to manslaughter.163 Thus, we are left to wonder whether she would
have faced a trial on the merits had Mr. Gottlieb continued as her lead
attorney. Citing Judge Ridgely's gag order, prosecutors and Grossberg's
lawyers refused to confirm or deny her plea bargain.164
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161. See id.
162. See id.
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